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The abolition of resa le price maintenance in Britain in 1964: a turning point for 
British manufacturers? 
'God made the wicked grocer as a mystery and a sign ... ' (G.K.Chesterton) 
The Resale Prices Act of 1964 banned RPM. I This Act was very fiercely contested within 
the Conservative Party, for opponents of the Bill feared that the numbers of independent 
retailers would dwindle so wldermining traditional areas of support for the Party. While 
the fears within the Conservative Party were welI-groWlded - the Act helped the long-
standing process of concentration within the retailing sector - this paper argues that to 
view the effect of the Act only in relation to the competitive struggle between large and 
small retai lers seriously Wlderestinlates the long-term significance of the Act. It argues 
th at the effect of the Act was to give legal acknowledgment to the growing powers of 
multiple retai lers, not only over smaller retailers, but more importantly over 
manufacturers. In turn the Act opened up a period in which, by the 1980's the shift in the 
balance of power between retailers and manufacturers was known, marked and the 
subject of academic and government enquiry as to its effects on consumer welfare. 2 
The paper has four parts. It begins with an outline of the extent of rpm and a brief 
description of the complex legislation which lead up to the final ban. Three points are 
I The Act made any condition or agreement between supplier and dealer concerning 
minimum resale prices void, unless the Restrictive Practices Court specifically 
allowed such an agreement to continue. It made it unlawful to withhold supplies on 
the groWlds that the dealer sold at prices below the published price, with the specific 
exclusion of goods used as ' Iossleaders' . 
2 G. Akehurst ' Concentration in Retail Distribution: Measurement and Significance ' in 
G. Akehurst and N. Alexander Retail Structure London:Cass (1995). e.g. R.Grant 
'Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships : The Shifting Balance of Power ' in G. Johnson 
(ed) Business Strategy and Retailing Chichester: John Wiley ( 1987), pp.43-58 . 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) Discounts to Retailers H.C.3 II 
London: HMSO (198 1); Office of Fair Trading Competition and Retailing London: 
OFT (1985). 
then developed . First, that the backbone of rpm derived from manufacturers, although 
supported by independent retailers, and that this tendency was actually increasing up to 
1964. Secondly, the paper outlines the ways in which retailer dominance was asserted as 
a result of 1964, especialJy through the growth of retailer brands. Finally the paper argues 
that the government's decision to abolish rpm was therefore a deliberate siding witJl large 
retailers in the competitive struggle, and involved a vital shift in the di stribution of 
property rights between manufacturers and retailers. 
Part 1: The extent ofrpm, 1956-64 
Resale price maintenance (hereafter rpm), or vertical price-fixing, is: 'a practice by which 
suppliers of goods designate the prices at which goods they sell shall be resold by 
distributors' ] The manufacturer retains the rights over his products, as regards pricing, 
even once they have been sold on to the wholesaler or retailers. Rpm took two forms . 
Either resale prices were determined or upheld or both, by groups of manufacturers 
and/or retailers, a form called ' collective rpm '. Under this a trade association could 
implement a boycott, adhered to by all members of the association, against fmns selling 
below the stipulated resale price. A second method was individual rpm, that is individual 
enforcement of rpm. This took the form either of agreements between a manufacturer and 
retailers and/or wholesalers, making observance of the fixed price contractual and 
enforceable through the use of boycott or refusal to grant discounts; or an individual 
suppLier might simply recommend prices and margins for distributors. Again a fmn could 
refuse to supply retailers/wholesalers selling below (or above) the fixed price. The fixing 
of the price meant also fixing retail margins. These could vary, although 33 .3% was very 
common. The retail margin represented an arithmetical measurement of the balance of 
competitive power between the various actors: manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers . 
3 Corwin D.Edwards Control o/Cartels and Monopolies. An International 
Comparison New York: Oceana (1967) p.10!. 
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Often the multiples could secure higher margins, of up to 40%, while on the other hand 
some manufacturers could squeeze retail margins -Heinz gave a margin of 16% in 19494 
Rpm first became significant in the 1890's and is strongly associated with the 
development of mass-produced branded goods . By 1938 about 30% of consumer 
expenditure was on price-maintained goods. 5 The war and post-war period greatly 
strengthened the practice and the influence of retail trade associations, while 
manufacturer branding and advertising increased . By 1956 an upper figure gave 55% of 
all consumer expenditure being on price-maintained goods, while another estimate put 
it at 34% on goods and services, and 44% on goods alone.6 
Rpm began to break down between 1956 and 1964 partly as a result of the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Tllis banned collective discrimination to enforce rpm, a 
practice which perhaps affected 13% of consumer expenditure in 19567. It thus removed 
the key prop in those trades where collective rpm was important - notably groceries, tyres 
and some toiletries. However, the Act strengthened ' individual ' rpm: prices arrived at 
individually by the manufacturer could be enforced on retailers through the courts, and 
trade associations could be used as the agent of a manufacturer to enforce price 
conditions. Indeed, the Act allowed a manufacturer to enforce his resale prices on third 
parties: that is someone with whom he did not have a contractual arrangement as to resale 
prices must still, if he had had due notice of them, stick to the fixed prices. As a result, 
while rpm probably decreased overall, it actually showed signs of strengthening 
• PRO BT641257 RPM(E)46 evidence of HJ .Heinz to the Committee on Resale Price 
Maintenance, 1948. 
5 J.F.Pickering Resale Price Maintenance in Practice London: Alien & Unwin, 1966, 
p.45 . 
6 Pickering Price Maintenance p.48, and citing Mark Abrams The Times 22 January 
1955. 
7 Pickering Price Maintenance p. 48. 
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elsewhere . Indeed, it was only once individual rpm became enforceable in 1956 that 
many manufacturers began to prescribe fixed resale prices: hence rpm spread in the 
hardware trade, footwear, electrical appliances, furniture, stationery and branded textiles.8 
In 1960 the government set up a confidential and internal committee of enquiry, whose 
report emphasised that market forces alone would not bring about its demise: the practice 
was finnly entrenched and required tough, unequivocal legislation9. 
Hence by 1960-64 rpm - that is rpm where the prices were decided by the manufacturer 
and enforced by his own efforts - was still extensive. Table 1 shows the wide variety of 
calculations made, but some agreement as to the general extent is evident: about 30-40% 
of consumer expenditure was on price-maintained goods. Table 2 isolates the key areas 
affected. The extent of rpm was, however, even greater than any of these figures would 
imply . The collection of figures was based on the government's view that rpm was a 
question of retailing restrictions which reduced competition and raised prices to the 
consumer. Hence the figures ignored those areas where rpm governed relationships 
between manufacturers and their industrial or public authority consumers. Evidence to 
the Board of Trade enquiry brought to light many such cases of rpm: in machine tools and 
machine tool equipment, office equipment, engineering tools, dentists ' equipment, 
surgical instruments, medical equipment, scientific and laboratory instruments and 
equipment, fertilisers, tractors, combine harvesters and their replacement parts. 10 Later, 
when rpm was barmed, manufacturers had to register their rpm agreements with the 
Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements : at this stage many more such cases came 
to light of goods not bought by the public but by firms or public authorities. For instance 
some of the goods covered were: cement, carbon paper, filing cabinets, compressed air 
8 Pickering Price Maintenance p.154. 
9 PRO BT25811187 ' Report of the Board of Trade Committee into Resale Price 
Maintenance' 2 October 1961, para.234. There were three members of this committee 
- R.W.A.Speed, R.F.Bretherton and 1.Stafford. 
10 PRO BT25811187 'RPM' pp.53-8. 
4 
motors, typewriters, microphones, mercwy, flocs, industrial gloves, steel ventilators for 
strongrooms, permanent magnets, surveying, hydrographic and navigational instruments, 
engineers ' revolution counters." 
Hence we may conclude that by 1964 individual rpm was a very prevalent practice 
penetrating deep into the heart of British manufacturing. Nor was it to disappear easily. 
The 1964 Act banned all fixed prices, although a manufacturer could recommend a 
maximum price. Those parties who wi shed to have their rpm conditions exempted had 
to register with the Registrar and these cases were then judged in batches by the 
Restrictive Practices Court. Only two cases were allowed - books and medicaments, and 
elsewhere rpm gradually broke down between 1964 and 1969 when the last of the batches 
was decided by the Court. However, rpm was widely replaced by recommended resaJe 
prices, which in turn became the subject of government enquiry. A Monopolies 
Commission report found recommended resale prices were especially prevalent in cars 
and parts, domestic electrical appliances, photographic goods, groceries wines and spirits 
and branded textiles. However, wide-spread cutting of recommended resale prices was 
notable in some case: groceries and electrical appliances (see Table 3). 
Pa rt 11: Manufacturers and rpm: the position in 1964 
By the 1960's, it is very clear that manufacturers in the area concerned kept a tenacious 
grip on the system of rpm. Between 1956 and 1964 manufacturers were empowered to 
enforce their prices through the courts. This power was used extensively as Table 4 
shows. These figures do not give a full picture as it was clear a court action was the last 
resort and simply the threat achieved the same ends: 90% of all cases where the 
manufacturer started to take action over reported price-cutting were settled before 
reaching court, by the trader giving the manufacturer undertakings. It was, indeed, mainly 
11 This was the list selected by B.S. Yamey 'United Kingdom' in B.S. Yamey (ed.) 
Resale Price Maintenance London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966, p.276. 
5 
the large manufacturers who took the legal route: a few large manufacturers obtained IO 
or more of the injunctions: the Beecham group lead the way with 18.12 
Evidence to two government enquiries supports this picture of manufacturer adherence 
to rpm. Manufacturers ' associations formed the single most important group providing 
evidence to the confidential Board of Trade enquiry into rpm of 1960. After the Act was 
passed those parties who wished to register their resale price conditions could do so 
within three months and these were then judged in groups by the Restrictive Practices 
Court. Most of these cases were not allowed, and the vast of bulk of them were not even 
contested. But in three cases a challenge was made and long judgments given -
confectionery, footwear and medicaments: in all three cases the case was made by the 
manufacturers - in particular the leading manufacturers, and although their arguments 
involved the concerns of small retailers the thrust of their evidence was the effect on the 
decisions of and strategies of manufacturers . \3 
As has already been shown, rpm was speedily replaced after 1964 by recommended resale 
prices . When this was investigated in 1968 the evidence given to the Monopolies 
Commission showed that recommended resale prices largely replaced rpm and 
manufacturers were the backbone of the system. Retailers ' organisations - the National 
Chamber of Trade and the Association of Engineering Distributors favoured the practice 
while the Federation of Wholesalers ' Organisations found it ' useful' . But in all the 
specific trades covered by the Commission, manufacturers provided fum and independent 
evidence in favour. 14 
12 Pickering Price Maintenance p.84 
13 BPP (1968-9) Restrictive Trading Agreements. Report of the Registrar, 1 July 1966 
to 30 June 1969 Vo1.18, Cmnd 4303, pp. 27-31. 
14 Monopolies Commission Recommended Resale Prices BPP (1968-9) Vo1.40 . 
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The Board of Trade's internal enquiIy of 1960 is an especially enlightening source for the 
opinion of manufacturers. The general tenor of remarks is well sumarised in the remarks 
of the Branded Textiles Group: 
The full advantages of large scale production .. . cannot be obtained and 
consequently cannot be passed on to the public unless reasonably long unintenupted 
production runs can be guaranteed and these, in turn, depend on wide distribution 
and steady demand .... By providing the retailer with a small though adequate profit 
margin and protecting him against loss-leading and price cutting, manufacturers are 
able to maintain the wide distribution network on which the whole system 
depends ' l l 
The perceived need for rpm varied across sectors. RPM allowed for specific conditions 
to prevail in certain sectors . In tobacco and confectionery where manufacturers believed 
' impulse buying' to be important rpm allowed for a proliferation of outlets.'6 III many 
areas, such as car accessories, books and electrical appliances rpm covered those retailers 
- often specialists - who stocked slow-selling brands. In turn this, it was argued, provided 
stable markets to allow mass production runs even for such slow-selling and relatively 
more expensive itemsn In electrical goods and spare parts for cars, rpm and fixed 
margins were a means to compensate the retailer for after and pre-sales service and so 
ensure tIlat quality and performance matched the promise of national advertising. Hence 
rpm was one aspect of tile conditions favouring large-scale production for mass markets. 18 
11 PRO BT25811 088 RPM(60) Brief2 1 'Textile Industry' Annex 1 'Memorandum on 
RPM ' by The Branded Textiles group. 
16 PRO BT25811087 'Report on rpm ' p.59. 
17 PRO BT258/ 1088 Booksellers Association 'Submission to the Board of Trade 
enquiry into RPM'. 
18 PRO BT25811088 RPM(60) Brieffor discussions with SMMT and BMTA and 
(continued ... ) 
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Rpm was perceived as being an important supplement to branding, as one manufacturer 
of branded textiles explained: 'if price wars start it is always the branded line that is 
used ,19 Finally, BEAMA - the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers ' Association 
made a case for rpm as a means to create stable conditions at home to foster extended 
exports. The industry faced strong foreign competition at home, abolition would 
' completely disrupt' the home trade, bring no benefit to the public and place an extra 
burden on British manufacturers20 
The case of those areas where rpm was practised which were not included in the Board 
of Trade's final assessment - where the relationship was one between manufacturers and 
their industrial or public authority customers - showed especially how rpm allowed for 
economies in distribution and accounting to be made by the manufacturer. The 
information which was made available to the Board of Trade in these commodities 
indicates that the ' retailers ' were distributors - combining the role of the retailer and 
wholesaler. The Association of Engineering Distributors described their members as 
neither wholesalers nor retailers but 'a specialist in the supply of engineering tools and 
equipment mainly to industrial users ' 21 Such goods would normally be branded and be 
nationally advertised in the trade and specialist press. What appears to be the common 
strand in all these trades are fairly limited numbers of producers of products facing a very 
large array of customers buying expensive and technical equipment requiring specialist 
pre and after-sales service. The distributor was the link between customer and 
manufacturer. Again the AED described its role as providing for the manufacturer, ' a 
li(. .. continued) 
RPM(60) Summary 1 ' Evidence from motor and allied manufacturers '. 
19 PRO BT258JI088 RPM(60) 21st meeting, 16 December 1960; RPM(60) Brief 2 1 
'Textile Industry ' . 
20 PRO BT258J1088 RPM(60) Brief 19,8 December 1960 summarising ' Statement on 
individual enforcement of resale prices ' by BEAMA, 7 December 1960. 
21 PRO BT258J\088, RPM(60) Brief 20, 13 December 1960. 
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steady succession of orders from a comparatively small number of distributors, instead 
of being inconvenienced by a large number of small accounts ' 22 
What emerges is a picture of the development of strong inter-fum relationships between 
retailers and suppliers, held together through the mutual support provided by rpm. This 
may have been especially the case for small retailers and their manufacturer suppliers, but 
a similar picture emerges when we turn to the relationship between manufacturers and 
larger retailers. 
The view that all large 'efficient ' retailers opposed rpm is seriously flawed. Three 
significant cases can be cited. Currys, a multiple retailer of electrical goods and bicycles, 
was clearly not unduly concerned about rpm, and was actually worried lest the abolition 
of rpm promote the discount house and cut into their margins. The official history 
expressed disquiet that the abolition of rpm and the growth of own brands prompted a 
flood of imports and ' doomed many well-known British manufacturers ' 23 In 
pharmaceuticals and stationery, the two leading multiple retailers opposed abolition : 
Boots and WH Smith. Boots ' position was outlined by the General Sales Manager, 
W.K.Oliver, that while the company enjoyed passing on to customers price reductions 
based on lower manufactming and distribution methods, 'we do support those 
manufacturers who make use of their right to maintain a standard price for a nationally 
advertised, branded product '24 When Sales Manager for WH Smith, Oliver expressed 
the same strong views, and with the Managing Director, Peter Bennett - later Managing 
Director of EMI - played an active part in the Resale Price Maintenance Co-ordinating 
22 PRO BT2581I 088, Brief 20. 
23 H.Lerner (1984) Czmys: Ihefirsl 100 years Cambridge: Woodhead Faulkner, 
pp.72-4. 
24 WH Smith archive (WHS) 487/ 1, speech given at the conference of the Incorporated 
Sales Managers ' Associations, May 1959, W.K.Oliver, General Sales Manager, Boots. 
9 
Committee - the major lobbyist for rpm with Govemment. 25 WH Smith ' s posi tion may 
be understood by the fact that over half of their turnover was actually derived from their 
wholesale business. Moreover, their heavy investment in small stalls - especially at 
railway stations - gave them perhaps some of the concerns of the smaller retailer6 In the 
case of WH Smith strong social as well as economic networks may be observed in the 
relationship between manufacturers and retailers, in the career of Peter Bennett. 
Through '1lm finns were 'embedded' in a set of economic relationships which provided 
mutual support.27 Not only were some large retailers in favour of retention, and enjoyed 
the mutual support between retailers and manufacturers that rpm symbolised, but the key 
backbone of support by the late 1950's and early 1960' s for the practice came from 
manufacturers. 
Part HI: manufacturers and RPM - the theoretical debate 
Manufacturer opinion was strong and their arguments raised serious questions relating 
to planning production, economies of scale in manufacturing, and the costs of advertising, 
storage and warehousing. These arguments were given little or no credence by the 
economists and civil servants and politicians who favoured abolition, who were 
convinced that rpm emerged from retailers ' desire to protect themselves against price-
cutting by large and 'efficient' multiple retailers and so ' to live a more comfortable life ' 28 
25 WHS 487/3, internal memo, 14 January 1964, and WHS 487/ 1-4 generally. 
26 Charles W. Wilson First with the News. The History ofWH.Smith 1792-1972 
London: Cape, 1985 for the main areas of Smith 's profitability. 
27 On the concept of 'embeddedness ' see, for instance H.Hakansson and J.Johanson 
'The network as a governance structure' in G.Grabher (ed.) The embeddedjirm. On 
the socioeconomics of industrial networks London: Routledge, 1993 pp.35-51. 
28 PRO BT258/ 1089 RPM(61) Report paper by H.Osborne (Secretary to the 
Departmental committee on RPM), ud. 
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Ministers and civil servants, and especially the government's confidential corrunittee of 
enquiry of 1960, frequently asserted that there was little dispute among economists: 
opinion overwhelmingly saw rpm as a restrictive practice in retailing. In fact the 
government deliberately ignored economists who gave theoretical support to the 
manufacturers ' position and who emphasised that rpm encouraged competition in 
production. 
Central to the debates of the time was the work of Basil Yamey whose I.E.A . pamphlet 
' Shoppers ' Choice ' played a significant role in securing abolition 29 For him, rpm had 
its origin among small retailers experiencing reductions in profit and turnover in the 
second half of the 19th century. The growth of branding meant standardised goods, the 
price of which in different shops could be easily compared. The rise of the large retailers 
who could sell these cheaply threatened small retailers who ' turned to organisation to 
protect their interests': 
' Associations of traditional retailers pressed their claims on the manufacturers of 
branded goods and urged them to introduce r.p.m . ... . Resale price maintenance 
historically, was not the indispensable complement to the successful introduction 
and marketing of branded goods by manufacturers: it was, rather, a consequence of 
conditions in retailing to which the success of branded goods had contributed. '30 
29 B.S. Yamey Resale price maintenance and Shoppers ' Choice I.E.A. (1960) 
30 B S Yamey ' United Kingdom ' in Yamey Price Maintenance p.25 I. His other 
important accounts of the history of rpm are 'The Origins of Price Maintenance in 
Three Branches of Retailing ' and 'Price Maintenance in the Chemist and Grocery 
Trades, 1890 to 1939' both in B.S. Yamey The Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance London: Pitrnan, 1954. See also 'Retail Price Competition and the 
Origins of the Net Book Agreement' in Russi Jal Taraporevala Competition and its 
control in the British book trade, 1850-1939 London: Pitrnan, 1973 . 
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In addition to Yamey's assertions about the historical origins of rpm, he provided some 
the of the key arguments for the view that rpm promoted inefficient allocation of labour 
and capital. ' Resale price maintenance is a restrictive business practice: it restricts or 
eliminates price competition in the distributive trades affected'. Competition through 
independent decisions on pricing would eliminate the less efficient and aid the expansion 
and establishment of more efficient firms, as well as the provision of consumer choice if 
price and services. ' It therefore keeps distributive margins and resale prices higher than 
they would otherwise be and involves more resources in distribution ']1 
But Yamey 's view was seriously challenged and his ideas became the pivot ofa series 
of debates. On the historical evidence l.BJefferys had argued that the growth of branded 
goods and rpm was part of a process by which manufacturers gained control over the 
distribution system, not only from the retailers but also from the wholesaler. Hence the 
effect of rpm for manufacturers was that, in the words of J B Jefferys : 
'the problems of marketing for manufacturers became better defmed and therefore 
more susceptible of solution, the flow of goods became smoother and the market for 
them more stable, and the quality and standard of the product could be more readily 
guaranteed. ,32 
It must be noted that manufacturers, early derived much benefit. Evidence by the PAT A, 
which operated rpm in chemists' goods, to the 1960 enquiry indicates that quite speedily 
manufacturers became aware of the problem of substitution: a branded article would be 
subject to price-cutting, giving retailers an incentive to persuade customers to buy a more 
expensive substitute, not subject to price-cutting. Hence 'the Manufacturer who has spent, 
31 B S Yamey ' Introduction: the main economic issues ' in Yamey Price Maintenance 
pp.3-4; for a very similar view see, for instance, W.G.McClelland Costs and 
Competition in Retailing New York: St.Martin 's (1966). 
32 J B Jefferys Retail Trading in Britain 1850-1950 Cambridge: CUP (1954) p. 55. 
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it may be, large swns of money in advertising his article and had induced the public to 
go to the Retailer and ask for it fowld that his money had been wasted, since the Retailer, 
in many cases, succeeded in substituting another article on which he could make a 
profit ' 33 
A second dispute in which Yamey was illVolved was with a fellow supporter of abolition 
- N icholas Kaldor, again around the relative importance of rpm to retailers and to 
manufacturers. Kaldor wrote to The TImes correctly noting that ' The real strength of the 
opposition to Mr. Heath 's Bill comes from powerful manufacturing interests, not the 
small retailer '. He argued they favoured rpm as ' the only sure guarantee against price 
wars'. With fixed prices manufacturers could easily ascertain whether manufacturers 
were departing from manufacturers ' price agreements - whether explicit or informal. 
Hence for Kaldor, the key advantage in the abolition of rpm was variable prices which 
would encourage price wars among manufacturers and so eliminate inefficient firms and 
release labour3 4 Yamey accepted the role of rpm in bolstering collective agreements 
among manufacturers. Indeed, this had been one of the central conclusions of an earlier 
enquiry into rpm - that of the Lloyd Jacob committee in 1949 which condemned 
collective rpm for turning ' price maintenance from a reasonable means of preventing 
damage to well-known quality brands ... into a comprehensive system for regulating and 
policing entire industries '35 However, he disputed Kaldor' s view that 'the really 
important issue is not price competition in retailing, but price competition among 
manufacturers,. 36 
33 PRO, BT2581l 176 ' Conditions that led to the formation of the PAT A' . 
34 N. Kaldor letter to The Times 17 March 1964. 
35 BPP ( 1948-49) Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance vol.xx Cmd 
7696, p.30. 
36 B. Yamey 
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On the whole, however, it was those economists who supported rpm who tended to 
emphasise the value of rpm as a rational and efficient strategy by manufacturers of mass 
produced goods, and as one which encouraged price competition among manufacturers. 
Yamey was involved in debates on this score with two British economists - P.W.S. 
Andrews and Frank Friday and with a representative of the Chicago school - Robert Bork. 
The views of Robert Bork and P.W.S.Andrews may be said to contain some overlap in 
th at both rejected the notion that the large business enterprise was uncompetitive and 
monopolistic and detrimental to economic growth37 
Frank Friday was, at the time of the government enquiry, an economist working for EMI 
Ltd, one of the vociferous supporters of rpm, and had been dismissed as tainted by Board 
of Trade report on this account. J8 He had written a pamphlet, in answer to Yamey's LE.A. 
pamphlet of 1960 with P.W.S. Andrews - Fair Trade. Andrews was a Fellow of Nuffield 
College, was pursuing his theories of competitive oligopoly, and his contribution to Fair 
Trade was an important stage in the development of his ideas3 9 Andrews was later to 
assert that, for both himself and Friday (who died in 1963) the key question was always 
whether rpm brought 'positive competitive advantage ': they both agreed that if it did not 
it could not be allowed to persist. They then argued that rpm actually encouraged 
competition.'o 
37 On Andrews see W.Young and F.S.Lee Oxford Economics and Oxford Economists 
London: Macmillan (l993)pp. 198, 202-3 . 
38 PRO BT258/ l 187 ' Report on RPM ' p. 3. 
39 Young and Lee Oxford Economics p.197 . 
• 0 WH Smith archive, Milton Hill, 487/3 'Some comments on rpm' by PWS Andrews, 
ud, c.January 1964. A copy of extracts from a letter from Andrews to an MP in 
response to a request for more information. This extract was circulated to members of 
the Resale Price Maintenance Co-ordinating Committee by its chairman Leonard 
Pagliero. 
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The Andrews and Friday approach was to look at how rpm restricted competition and 
how it allowed it and encouraged it. Andrews started with a proposition similar to 
Yamey's that rpm was a restriction on competition among retailers, but pointed out how 
it sustained competition among manufacturers. Because 'distribution does its job 
relatively well ' gains could be made in manufacturing. He argued that competition 
between brands aided standardisation in mass production, and that, where brands were 
price maintained, ' the rule stands that standard goods will have to have standard prices 
if demand is to run steadily at the level justified by their real qualities in the view of the 
consumer and, withal, the levels at which prices are standardised must be such that each 
is fully competitive with other goods ,41 The manufacturer had to set the retail price to be 
competitive with retailers ' brands and with the rpm brands of other manufacturers. He 
argued that as well as giving after-sales services (which Yamey and others dismissed as 
something which the consumer mayor may not want) rpm allowed for a vital pre-sales 
service - having stock and a choice of stock for customers to buy. In this way rpm could 
enable manufacturers of branded goods to produce in large quantities - because they 
could be assured of large stocks being carried - and hence reap lower costs. Moreover, 
rpm made it easier for the smaller manufacturer to compete and grow: 'large scale price 
cutting retailers will not want to bother with minor brands' - a prediction which was to 
come true, as we shall see:2 Thus, overall, ' to the extent to which a general ban on rpm 
weakens the thrust from manufacturers' brands, the whole competitiveness of retail trade 
will in the long run itself be weakened; such a ban ... must itself reduce an important 
influence keeping prices in general down' 4 3 He argued, moreover, that rpm was not an 
obstacle to the development of the more ' efficient' retailer, for the selling involved in a 
price-maintained, branded good was in itself a more 'standard operation', hence reducing 
41 P.W.S.Andrews and Frank Friday Fair Trade. Resale Price Maintenance Re-
examined London: Macmillan (1960) p.61-2 . 
'2 WH Smith archive 487/3, letter from Andrews, and see P.W.S. Andrews and Frank 
Friday Fair Trade. 
43 Andrews and Friday Fair Trade p.62. 
15 
any differences in the costs of different retailers of selling a particular product. That if 
such differences in cost did exist for the more ' efficient' retailer, this provided a great 
competitive potential for their own brands: ' If they cannot drive out the rival brand, 
surely the critics are mistaken '.44 
Their key conclusion was that a ban on rpm was likely to reduce the competitive 
pressures in retailing and manufacturing. Together they argued that these considerations 
militated against any price reductions as a result of abolition. In addition, Andrews and 
Friday stressed that rpm had to be seen as having the same rationale as direct price 
maintenance, a system whereby a multiple retailer charged standard prices for goods in 
all shops throughout the country. Friday was the only economist who had separated out 
the two elements (see Table I). Andrews argued that ' Large retailers obey this rule (of 
standard prices) for their "brands" by having standard prices at their various branches' . 
Indeed, the Board of Trade explicitly excused rpm on these grounds, arguing that it: 
' is not a restrictive practice but is a form of trading said to be essential to the method of 
doing business employed by a large multiple concern where management is centralised 
and costing and accounting are done on a group basis"5 
Andrews and Friday saw no difference between this and the justification for rpm. 
A final approach to the issue came from the Chicago school. Their ideas as regards rpm 
had been developed in the 1950' s by Aaron Director whose basic approach was that 
manufacturers would not be acting rationally to impose rpm if it simply gave retailers 
monopoly profits. Its rationale was seen to stem from the way the prevention of price 
competition among retailers encouraged them to provide services which enhanced the 
44 Andrews and Friday Fair Trade p.63. 
45 PRO BT258/ 1187 'Resale price Maintenance ' p.9 para.62 
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value of the manufacturer' s product to consumers. From this and other points the Chicago 
school developed a position on antitrust policy which sought to exclude from its 
jurisdiction unilateral action by businessmen."6 The position was developed by Robert 
Bork: 
'No manufacturer will desire r.p.m. for the mere purpose of giving his resellers a 
greater than competitive return .. .. . What he gets is usually increased activity by the 
reseller in providing information, promotional services and the like. These are 
means of increasing distributive efficiency and should be permitted on grounds of 
efficient resource allocation. The case is no different than if the manufacturer 
owned the resellers and required his resell er employees to perform the same 
functions. R.p.m. is simply a partial integration and is often more efficient than full 
integration by ownership or contract' H 
Here is a proto-Chandlerian defence of rpm - the internalisation of retailing decisions 
without forward integration into retailing itself. We may conclude that effectively, the 
manufacturers of branded, price-maintained goods collectively supported retailers. Rpm 
acted not only as partial or quasi vertical integration, but also shared integration: 
manufacturers and retailers of specific products or product areas operated a mutually 
supportive network. Here, then, another economist supported manufacturers ' positive 
view of the efficiencies available through networks of support. 
"6 See Richard A. Posner ' The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis ' University 0/ 
Pennsylvania Law Review 127, 4 (April, 1979) p.926-8, reprinted in G.Burgess (ed.) 
Regulation and Antitrust Aldershot: Elgar 1992 .. 
.. 7 Robert H. Bork ' A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey' Yale Law Journal 76,4 
(March 1967) p.73 I. 
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This section has shown considerable economists ' support for the case of manufacturers 
and for the fears they expressed concerning the increased powers of retailers. We now 
turn to the actual outcomes. 
Part IV: the competitive struggle between large retailers and manufacturers 
The end of rpm saw the further development of the multiple retailer, further erosion of 
the position of the independent retailer and further concentration in the retailing sector. 
In 1950, when the first Census of Distribution was taken there were 400,000 retail 
businesses covering half a million outlets : by the early 1980' s there were 230,000 
businesses with one third of a million outlets48 In groceries in 1960 80% of the grocery 
market was controlled by 1621 buying points, in 1970 by 6474 9 Electrical goods was hard 
hit by abolition which prompted heavy price-cutting and the arrival of discount stores 
such as Comet and Trident. Here multiples increased their share of retail sales from 
19.5% in 1961 to 24.8% in 1966 to 37% by 1979 .~o This represented the reassertion of 
a trend which had stagnated under the strong influence of rpm in the war and post-war 
period. It must, however be added that rpm had not stifled the growth of large stores, 
many of whom were able to use rpm multiple businesses to increase their profits and use 
these as a basis for future expansion.~ ' Given that rpm was actually showing signs of 
increase, the role of the 1964 Act was not to promote a new development, but to stop the 
further development of rpm and to ensure the continuation and reassertion of a long-
standing process - the increasing significance of multiple shops. 
48 N.Alexander 'Contemporary Perspectives in Retail Development' in G.Akehurst and 
N.Alexander (eds.) Retail Structure London: Cass (1995) p.3. 
49 ETU Retail Business 166 (Dec.1971) p.32 
~o N. R.Eassie and P.Robertson British Retailing. Facts and Trends 1980 Mintel, 
1980 p.82. 
~I Yamey ' Introduction' ; C.J .Morelli The Making of the Market unpublished thesis, 
LSE, 1996 pp.260-2. 
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Where the abolition of rpm did produce a qualitatively new trend was in the pressure 
retailers were now able to exert over manufacturers of branded goods. The most 
important weapon in the struggle became the private brand. In 1968 the Economist 
Intelligence Unit saw the growth of own brands as the most far-reaching development 
in retailing, as one which had seen considerable growth in the past 5 years - that is shortly 
before the abolition of RPM. It commented: 
'Own branding is a major factor at work in the evolution of the power relationship 
between manufacturer, distributor and consumer. Indeed, it can take the credit for 
knitting together these logically inseparable functions, not merely linearly but a as 
cyclical situation in which feedback from consumer to manufacturer is at last 
becoming a practicable reality ' 5 2 
An own brand is a retailer ' s own label, rarely made by the retailer, and often made by 
smaller manufacturers, although large manufacturers have increasingly been forced to 
produce own brandsB Retailers found own brands useful not only in their competitive 
struggle with other retailers, especially through its ability to give a corporate image and 
encourage customer loyalty, but also because it provided better margins, it allowed the 
store to control the product range and price, it allowed the retailer to reduce the influence 
of manufacturers advertised brands through direct competition from own brands, and in 
turn this allowed retailers to squeeze manufacturers ' for extra margins. Finally, own 
brands protected the retailer when competition between manufacturers forces lower retail 
margins. Moreover, the development of own brands is a relatively cheap strategy, for all 
the costs and risks of investment in R&D and plant are borne by the manufacturer. 54 
51 EIU Retail Business 128 (October, 1968) p. 12. 
53 Euromonitor The Own Brands Report London: Euromonitor (2nd ed., 1986) p.3. 
54 Euromonitor Own Brands pp. 19-20. 
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Own brands were not new having shown strong growth up to 1939, when in groceries 10-
15% of total sales of the multiples were own brands55 • However, they appeared to have 
suffered a reverse in the war and post-war period, and this is not unconnected with the 
fact the rpm became more thoroughly enforced. An indication of the growing strength of 
retailer brands was the formation in 1970 of the Private Label Manufacturers ' Association 
and the 1970's saw particularly string development. By 1986 own brands took 22.3% of 
the total retail sales, although the process was uneven across the retailing sector. Hence 
60% of Sainsbwy's total sales in 1985 was represented by own brands, 40% of Tesco ' s, 
32% of Boots, 18% of Currys. 56 By 1996 retailer brands took 36.7% of retail sales . 
The abolition, or the expectation of the abolition of RPM was a mighty factor causing an 
increase, as many manufacturers feared. All retailers began to practice it. Multiple 
retailers, especially in groceries and electrical appliances are the best known examples. 
Department stores saw an increase in private branding from 1956 onwards, for instance 
John Lewis developed its 'Jonelle ' trademark on range of goods - cosmetics, glassware 
and refrigerators. Mail order houses had increased their use of manufacturer brands to 
40% by 1964. Manufacturers began to notice a change in the attitude of mail order houses 
from about 1963, when anticipating the abolition of rpm they accentuated private brands, 
for instance in s~1mwear and refrigerators. Finally, small shopkeepers in voluntary chains 
also became involved in the practice. This is well known in groceries, but also occurred 
increasingly in chemists goods . Unichem, for instance, was a voluntary chain of 2,000 
retailer chemist members. In particular Unichem began to supply medicines already made 
up which chemists had previously compounded in their own shops57 
55 EnJ Retail Business 88 (June 1965) p.11. 
56 Euromonitor Own Brands p, 11 
57 EnJ Retail Business 89, (July, 1965) 12-14. 
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But the extent of own brands in different sectors and for different products was very 
much the outcome of the balance of forces between retailer and manufacturer. Those 
areas where competition among manufacturers was strong were very sensitive to own 
brands: in groceries by 1971 , own label products accounted for 20% of the turnover of 
packaged goods. The policies of multiples here was to carry a couple of nationally 
advertised leading manufacturer brands but to rationalise the secondary brands by 
providing their own. One report showed that in 10 product classes sold by mUltiple 
grocers, 75% of the private label progress had been made at the expense of the minor 
brands ,ss It was not until the 1990 ' s that Heinz finally gave way and began to make own 
brands, while Kellogg 's is still able to resist the pressure. 
But where a product was dominated by one or a few firms, own branding made little 
headway, for here the dominance of the nationally advertised product and the producer's 
own size in the market, made the introduction of own brands very risky. An interesting 
case of the differential impact is provided in the electrical appliances sector. Here up to 
1964 RPM had been strongly enforced and own branding was unknown. When RPM was 
abandoned own branding appeared in those items where manufacturer competition was 
quite strong - such as refrigerators. Here own brands captured 22% of the market between 
1964 and 1976. Own branding was initially less successful in automatic washing 
machines and vacuum cleaners where production was not so competitive and 
manufacturers could refuse to supply own brands. However, long-term this strategy had 
to give way primarily in the face of growing foreign competition. The share of imports 
in automatic washing machines, for instance grew from 5% in 1969 to 30% by 1975 of 
which one half went to private brand owners. Thus in 1975 Hoovers reversed its policy 
of refusing to supply and by 1976 the private brands share of the market stood at 17%. 
In electric cookers foreign competition was minimal due to the specific demands of 
British housewives and the Electricity Board' s monopsony. However, this did not 
speedily encourage own branding because a spate of mergers occurred among producers 
ss EIU Retail Business 166 (Dec.1971 ) pp.27-35. 
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in the mid to late 1960's. In turn, there were claims that producers acted collusively to 
refuse to supply a private brand to the Board and this position showed little sign of 
weakening in the 1970' s.59 
Hence in 1981, the MMC's investigation into discounts to retailers, gave a broad picture 
of the effect of the shake-up in distribution since the 1960's. The Commission expressed 
the view that pressure on suppliers by large buyers resulted in the elimination of excess 
production capacity among suppliers ' so that an unequal trading relationship tends to be 
redressed '60 as mergers and takeovers occur in manufacturing. The indication was that the 
abolition of rpm had produced a situation of oligopolistic rivalry, a point endorsed by 
later surveys by market research reports. According to one, multiples have been unwilling 
to accept price rises despite rising production costs and manufacturers have hence 'had 
to absorb the losses internally' . Only large firms, like Proctor and Gamble had the 
resources to respond to own brands and introduce low cost ranges.6 1 
lndeed, these surveys painted a gloomy future for manufacturers. Mintel ' s interviews with 
retailers and manufacturers in 1980 reported the striking 'dominance of the retailers both 
psychologically and in practice. Among manufacturers there seems to be something of 
a crisis of confidence, as though they had lost control over their destiny ' . The situation 
in groceries was reported as particularly bad, manufacturers being caught between 
farmers and multiple retai lers. One manufacturer complained that the leading retailers 
'can kill off a brand regardless of intrinsic consumer demand and benefits ' 62 The same 
59 C.W.F.Baden-Fuller ' The economics of private brands with special reference to the 
domestic electrical appliance industries of the U.K. and U.s.A.' unpublished thesis, 
LSE, 1980, pp.67, 158-164. 
60 MMC Discounts p.34. 
61 Keynote Own Brands , 1997, p.33 . 
62 Eassie and Robertson Retailing pp.163, 2166262 
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report noted that two thirds of those interviewed felt co-operation between retailers and 
manufacturers had become strained. One electrical manufacturer said: 
Fifteen years ago manufacturers could dictate policy to the retail trade in the market 
place . ow the situation is reversed : large retail chains can dictate the terms of 
business to manufacturers ' 63 
This raises the notion that, dating primarily from 1964 manufacturers in may areas have 
taken on the role of sub-contractors to large retailers : production has become part of the 
strategy of retailers rather than retailing being the strategy of manufacturers. Marks and 
Spencer' s relationships with suppliers is a prime example of the process. In the 1980's, 
government enquiries had a sanguine attitude to these development: but on the whole they 
are a proof of the prophecies of the opponents of government policy in 1964, not of its 
supporters. 
Part IV: government' s role in the competitive struggle 
So far this article has shown that resale price maintenance was a strong and, in some 
areas, growing system. In the short-term, the abolition of rpm put pressure on the 
manufacturing sector in a way envisaged by its supporters and that, in the long-term the 
1964 Act was a major catalyst ill producing serious change in the balance of power 
between manufacturers and retailers. The government therefore decided to redistribute 
property rights over articles for sale away from manufacturers and towards retailers. The 
goverrunent was aware of the legal implications of the step. Although there was little 
opposition in Cabinet to the measure, the main critical voice was that of Lord Hailsharn, 
then Lord President of the Council in AJex Douglas-Home ' s Cabinet. He argued that the 
change carried serious legal implications, for removing the manufacturer' s right to 
stipulate a retail price 'would tend to undennine the law which in general supported 
63 Eassie and Robertson Retailing p.22S . 
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contracts reached freely between parties' .64 In the debate on the second reading Douglas 
J ay condemned the 1956 Act for coming in 'with a crash' on the side of the manufacturer, 
but saw the proposed Bill as a law based 'equally heavily against the manufacturer ,65. 
In this regard the Act of 1964 represented a reversal of previous policies. Immediately 
prior to 1964 the trend of judgments in rpm cases showed an increasing willingness to 
uphold the right of the manufacturer to prevent price-cutting if he is opposed to it. The 
courts further upheld for manufacturers that coupons or trading stamps also constituted 
a breach of rpm. The decisions of the MC were equivocal: in three cases immediately 
before the Act individual rpm had been condoned in cigarettes and tobacco, but strongly 
condemned in electrical equipment for motor vehicles and wallpaper. However, the last 
general enquiry in 1949 had been very clear that a manufacturer had the legal right to 
stipulate conditions under which his goods were sold66 
We therefore have to enquire into the government's motives. In his speech on the Second 
Reading, Edward Heath gave three reasons. First, that abolition would encourage efficient 
retailing and allow the best allocation of resources, secondly that it would stimulate price 
competition among manufacturers, and thirdly, that as a result prices would go down. 
How reasonable were government expectations on these points? 
If the government had expected abolition to intensify competition among manufacturers 
how would this have come about? One method would have been, as Kaldor argued, to 
render the policing of manufacturers' cartels harder. 67 But the second means could only 
64 PRO CAB134/ 1693 , EA(62) I 3th, 4 April 1962. 
65 Parl.Deb. (1963-4) vol.69 1 10 March 1964 col. 283-4. 
66 BPP (1948-49) Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance Vol.20 Cmd. 
7696 p.35 . 
67 PRO BT258/ 1187 'Report on rpm' para.95 
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be through pressure on manufacturers ' prices by the large-scale retailers , themselves 
encouraged by the abolition of rpm. In several places the Board of trade ' s internal report 
welcomed the removal over pricing decisions from the manufacturer: ' we dispute that the 
manufacturer is the best judge of the appropriate price of his goods to the consumer ' and 
' We believe that one reason why manufacturers prefer to have a large number of 
small retail outlets is that if retai ling is concentrated in a few hands, di stributors will 
be more powerful to exert pressure on the manufacturers. We do not think, 
however, that the retention of resale price maintenance would be justified on the 
ground that it protects manufacturers from retailers pressure, nor do we think .... that 
the abolition of resale price maintenance would result in the emergence of powerful 
monopolies in the distribution trades ' 68 
The Board of Trade saw this switch in the balance of power, almost as a side effect of 
abolition: it was actually the most important effect and campaigns raged around precisely 
that question. Much discussion revolved around the question of who had the right to 
intervene in whose business decisions. Robert Bork argued strongly that it was improper 
for a court to supervise a manufacturer 's decisions; Basil Yamey, 1.R. Gould and 
McClelland fervently opposed the supervision of resellers ' business decisions by the 
manufacturer.69 
Hence, the government 's internal enquiry welcomed the stimulus to manufacturer 
competition through pressure from retailers, downplayed the danger of retail monopolies, 
68 PRO BT25811187 ' Report on rpm ' para. 128. 
69 1.R. Gould and B.S. Yamey . Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing' , Yale Law 
Journal, 76,4 (March 1967); R. Bork 'A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey ' Yale 
Law Journal, 76,4 (March 1967); R. Bork . Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer 
Welfare ' Yale Law Journal, 77,5 (April , 1968); 1.R. Gould and B.S. Yamey 'Professor 
Bork on Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder, Yale Law Journal, 77,5 (April, 1968). 
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and ignored those economists who argued that rpm allowed for competition in 
manufacturing, through, for example, allowing the swvival of smaller manufacturers. The 
government must have envisaged that the abolition of rpm would prompt a process of 
concentration in both retailing and manufacturing, and such hopes clearly fir well with 
the trend of government policies at the time towards the development of the large firm. 70 
On the question of the control of inflation, the government used estimates for price falls 
after abolition to urge their case, but the evidence was disputable. Basil Yamey predicted 
a fall in retail prices over the field affected of about 5% were rpm abolished. He 
described both his estimate of the extent of rpm as 'conservative' and his estimate of 
price reductions as ' cautious '. He further estimated this represented a saving to the 
consumer public of £180m. per annum.7\ 
Contrary to the impression that the Board of Trade committee and government spokesmen 
liked to given, Yamey 's predictions, although supported by some,73 were widely 
challenged in economists ' circles, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Indeed of 
the four economists interviewed by the Board of Trade Committee - Yamey, Friday, 
70 H.Mercer 'The state and British business since 1945 ' in M.W.Kirby and M.B.Rose 
(eds.) BlIsiness enterprise in modern Britain London: Routledge, 1994, pp.287-314. 
7\ Yamey Shoppers ' Choice pp.8, 15. 
72 The Board of Trade report was especiaJly misleading on this question. Under the 
heading ' Economists ' views ' it commented: 'The bulk of the opinion in favour of 
abolishing resale prices maintenance has been provided by economists ; but they are 
suppOlted by a minority ofretums from individual traders and suppliers and by some 
independent opinion obtained by us orally. The independent opinion was on the whole 
more carefully thought out and less emotional than the general run of commercial 
arguments submitted i.n favour of continuing resale price maintenance '. PRO 
BT2581l187 ' Report on rpm ' para 23 
73 J.F.Pickering 'Would Prices Rise without R.P.M.?' Oxford Economic Papers 21,2 
(July, 1969) pp. 248-267; McClelland Retailing p.275, although he simply state that 
there is no reason to doubt the validity ofYamey's case, nor to doubt that argument in 
favour of rpm 'are almost completely specious '. 
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J.B.Heath and E.M.Hugh-Jones - only one (Yamey) gave any definite assurance on this 
point. Hugh-Jones, although in favour of abolition commented that ' price stability' could 
be efficient from the shopper' s point of view if fully-stocked retail outlets were readily 
accessible everywhere' .7' J.B .Heath thought Yamey 's estimate ' as good a guess as any ' 
but even so considered such savings ' insignificant '. He went on to argue that where rpm 
was used to cross-subsidise other, often specialist, goods the prices of these might rise. 
Hence he thought the market level of prices generally might be higher or lower but they 
would be higher on the periphery (in more remote areas) which would have social 
implications which the govemment could perhaps resolve by direct subsidy (presumably 
to shopkeepers in such areas). Heath also feared that a loss of after-sales service might 
result. While rpm might force the consumer to have services he did NOT choose, 
abolition might restrict choice if specialist products or services became unobtainable.75 
Indeed, in 1965, an article by 1.R.Gould and L.E.Preston asserted that the view that rpm 
would raise prices was 'somewhat casually asserted ' and delineated cases where rpm, 
where marginal costs for manufacturers were falling would be conducive to a fall in 
prices. Rpm might, on the other hand make prices more elastic by spreading customers' 
knowledge of prices, wider distribution networks, advertisement of prices and price 
uniformity. 76 
Frank Friday ' s position was of course the most opposed to any idea that retail prices 
would fall , on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The extent of rpm, he argued was 
actually lower than Yamey asserted, while the extent of reductions without rpm had been 
obtained by exaggerating the evidence from Canada. Friday found that Yamey had cited 
the five largest reductions on various products sold, and taken the average of these. He 
also cited other studies which found negligible price falls could be expected. Two 
74 BT25811088 RPM(60) lOth, witness - Prof. Hugh-Jones, 28 October 1960. 
75 BT258/ 1088 RPM(60) 8th, witness - 1.B.Heath, 15 August 1960. 
76 1.R.Gould and L.E.Preston 'Resale price Maintenance and Retail Outlets ' 
Economica 32, 127 (August, 1965) pp.302-312. 
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American studies, one by the FTC, found few definite tendencies. One comparison of 
Illinois, where '1lm was effective, and Missouri , where it had never applied, showed 
prices 0.5% higher in Illinoi s77 
The Board of Trade itself did not take Yamey 's estimates seriously, although again they 
were ambiguous. In their internal discussion of Yamey 's I.E.A. pamphlet the committee 
wondered whether £180m was a valid figure, given that Yamey accepted in the same 
paper that the abolition of'1lm would lead to a higher price for specialist services, while 
increased competition would involve higher advertising costs.78 Indeed, the committee 
took the issue of advertising seriously enough to call a firm of advertising consultants as 
witnesses. These argued that the end of rpm would mean more advertising by retailers and 
by larger manufacturers. The committee was to misquote their evidence reporting their 
views as being that any extra advertising by large retailers would be offset by a reduction 
in manufacturers ' advertising.79 However, a later Board of Trade committee on 
monopolies, wh.ich was set up to develop general policies on monopolies, mergers as well 
as '1lm, argued quite decisively that few price reductions could be expected. 
Looking forward, it is very doubtful if such price reductions were actually effected. In his 
1966 book Yamey argued: 
'The practice has little, if any, influence on total national money expenditure or on 
the availability of total national resources. It is relevant to the economy-wide issues 
of inflation mainly in so far as it effects the fl exibility of particular prices .... . price 
77 Andrews and Firday Fair Trade pp.30-35 and PRO BT259/ 1088 RPM(60) 11 th -
witness Frank Friday, I November 1960. 
78 PRO BT25811088 RPM(60) Brief 2 for meeting with Prof. Yamey, 9 August 1960. 
79 PRO BT25811 089 RPM(61)2nd meeting with witnesses from Colman, Prentice and 
Varlet Ltd, 15 February 1961. And report on '1lm para 113 . In fact the response of 
larger manufacturers has seen increased product differentiation, brand promotion and 
advertising, see Grant ' Shifting Balance of Power' p.52. 
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reductions ... . can be no more than a once-for-all possibility. One cannot abolish 
r.p.m. every few years. The real importance of r.p.m., or of its prohibition or 
reduction, lies in its effects on the prices of particular goods and the deployment of 
resources between different economic activities. '80 
Yamey ' s figures had been widely cited during Cabinet discussions. In fact they were 
used by the government, when the basis for such predictions was actually weak. 
Hence the government and the civil servants came down on one side of heavily-disputed 
points oflaw and economics, even moral rights! It is not possible to accept as given their 
public claims for the step. Instead the explanation for this is to be found in two main 
areas. First antipathy to anything that smacked of restrictionism was strongly in keeping 
with the tenor or government thinking of the time. Although the pro-competition elements 
of government policy at this stage are perhaps less well-known that the growing interest 
in planning, it was in fact of increasing importance. In addition, such views dovetailed 
with the need to gear Britain to entry into Europe: here the Treaty of Rome and individual 
countries were moving towards bans on rpm. 
Secondly, there is strong evidence of pressure from some, very powerful retailing 
interests. Powerful associations of manufacturing and retailing interests were opposed to 
abolition. We know that some outstanding representatives oflarge-scale efficient retailing 
were also opposed - WH Smith, Boots and Curry's. Moreover, there was some dissension 
within some supporters of abolition. Edward Heath had introduced his Bill in January 
1964 in order to pre-empt a similar private member's Bill put forward by John 
Stonehouse, a Co-op sponsored MP. While the Co-op had campaigned for long against 
rpm, by 1964 some serious questions were being asked about this position. 
80 Yamey ' Introduction ' in Yamey Price Maintenance p .3. 
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As usual in these cases we do not have a strong feeling of who favoured abolition. From 
the Board of Trade evidence was forthcoming from a few areas: among manufacturers the 
vertically integrated footwear sector, among retailers some department stores like John 
Lewis gave evidence. Chain stories like Mark and Spencer, Woolworths stood to gain, 
but not, in the case ofM&S hugely, given that their reliance on direct price maintenance 
already gave them some independence from the whole issue. One hint is provided by the 
vigorous campaign in favour of trading stamps waged by a few grocery multiples from 
1963. Trading stamps was a method of encouraging customer loyalty, the effect of which 
was to undermine 'Pm. This campaign and the enthusiasm for trading stamps among firms 
like Fine Fare and Tesco reflected intensifying competition in retailing. The importance 
of pre-packaged goods of uniform quality, especially in the grocery trade, destroyed the 
demarcations between retailers, a trend intensified by the increasingly general adoption 
of the self-service store - even by independents. At the same time the development of the 
superstore meant a rise in overhead costs relative to variable costs, and the need to 
operate with a minimum of excess capacity. In addition the multiples faced increasing 
competition from the incursion of non-food retailers into the food trade, like Marks and 
Spencer and Boots, intensified competition from voluntary chains, and in 1962-4 ' for the 
first time' the large grocery multiples began to compete with each other, seeking to 
improve market share.81 
While other retail multiples could afford to live with rpm, and even use the assured 
margins as a basis for further expansion, the grocery multiples needed to improve their 
relative market position, but sold products where expansion of demand was limited. Here 
the abolition of rpm became imperative, especially as it affected non-food areas into 
which they hoped to expand. Even so, Sainsbury's, while favouring the abolition of rpm 
in groceries was a key agent in the anti-stamp campaign, which in turn derived much of 
81 C.Fulop The role a/trading stamps in retail competition London: lEA (1964) 
pp. 13-4; George Schwartz and W.R.Hunter The Facts about Trading Stamps London: 
Green Shield Ltd (1962) p. 1 O. 
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its support from manufacturers who opposed trading stamps because they undermined 
rpm. 
Hence, the strong blows in the corpse of resale price maintenance may be traced to two 
parties : discount houses and cut-price grocery firms ; and a govenunent increasingly 
concerned to promote competition in the British economy and to bring Britain into line 
with the EEC. 
Conclusion 
1964 was indeed a turning point or manufacturers in their relationship with retailers. This 
was an outcome envisaged and encouraged by a government with a zeal for competition, 
which correctly identified rpm as the fulcrum of a series of economic relationships 
covering wide swathes of British manufacturing. At the time these relationships seemed 
collusive and restrictive: modem analysis might be more willing to endorse the views of 
the minority of economists at the time who saw rpm as a form of vertical integration 
which encouraged efftciency and competition. Modern theories of inter-firm networks 
might see greater scope for the set of relationships cemented through rpm as factors in 
national competitiveness. 
The shift in property rights contributed to a growing lack of confidence among British 
manufacturers, which became apparent with the growth of own brands in the 1970' s. At 
the same time manufacturers faced spiralling costs, and, from 1973 the shake-up 
contingent on entry into Europe: rising wages costs and increased competitive pressures. 
In this light 1964 appears quite cataclysmic - removing an area of stability in an 
increasingly volatile and harsh competitive environment. Hence, an historical analogy 
presents itself: 1964 was for the relationship between manufacturers and retailers what 
1846 was for the political dominance of manufacturing over landed interests. Like the 
abolition of the Corn Laws, the effects were delayed but anticipated. 
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voL40 pp. I-2. 
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